While any American is right to get his blood up when a foreign dictator mocks our Dear Leader, who can doubt the truth of that statement in light of the President's stunning new "nuclear posture" policy? In his new formulation of America’s long-standing policy regarding possible use of nukes, the President has rhetorically-- if not legally-- committed to tie America's hands in responding to threats or, for that matter, acts of war by our adversaries. According to Fred Kaplan of Slate.com, a liberal foreign policy analyst, Obama’s strategy rejects the use of nuclear weapons against any country that has signed and/or is in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In other words, if such a country attacked or sponsored an attack on the U.S. (or on U.S. interests abroad) using conventional, biological or chemical weapons, the U.S. would rule out a nuclear retaliatory strike, whether or not justifed militarily.
Mr. Kaplan attempts to downplay the impact of the new policy by suggesting that since it rejects a doctrine of “no first use” it is hardly a radical change from prior policy. A "no first use" doctrine would have committed the U.S. to never use nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear threat or attack. But the fact that the policy isn’t as unhinged from reality as it might have been doesn’t make it any less foolish or irrational.
Kaplan suggests that, among other salutary effects, the new policy will “provide another incentive for countries—even unfriendly countries—not to develop nuclear weapons (if they believe the U.S. declaration, anyway), and... further isolate those countries that are in violation of the NPT—which is to say, Iran and North Korea.” Yet it is hard to square that conclusion with another assertion by Kaplan--an accurate one--that the Obama policy removes the “strategic ambiguity” of prior policy.
For the long duration of the Cold War and beyond, the doctrine of “strategic ambiguity,” along with that of “Mutually Assured Destruction,” not only kept the bad guys guessing what the West’s response to an attack of any kind would be, but it gave aid and comfort to our allies. A bad actor could never really be sure that the U.S would act with restraint, and therefore would govern his action accordingly. Now we are told that the doctrines that have prevented the firing of nuclear weapons in anger for the past 65 years are relics of the past.
Michael Goodwin points out that Obama’s portrayal of the new policy as a middle course between liberals and conservatives is absurd. The fact that the policy is only merely dangerous and not suicidal (although it may be that) doesn’t make it a “middle course.” Goodwin notes that the policy is grounded in a childish fantasy of a nuke-free world and a complete misreading of human nature.
As for the true effects of this policy on our enemies, Goodwin writes that outlaw states will continue to pursue nuclear weapons and now feel emboldened to use them. And as for our allies: “If we are no longer able or willing to protect them, they would probably side with our adversaries or ramp up their own militaries to defend themselves. That could destroy the peaceful equilibrium that has kept major nations in Europe and Asia from fighting full-scale wars for more than 50 years.”
Journalist Claudia Rosett, who understands rogue nations as well as anyone given that her beat was the United Nations--expects a surge in the development of chemical and biological weapons even by countries that are NPT compliant. With “strategic ambiguity” relegated to the ancient past, our adversaries need not worry that a mass-casualty attack of the non-nuclear sort will trigger a nuclear response. Claudia points out that rather than welcoming the new U.S. posture as a gesture of friendship, our adversaries--like the aforementioned dictator of Tehran--will view it as a lessening of our resolve to defend ourselves and our allies.
The nuclear posture review doesn’t just consist of a change of rhetoric vis a vis our enemies. It also promises not to replenish our aging arsenal of nuclear weaponry. According to Fred Kaplan, the U.S. will not build any new nuclear warheads, “period.” But we will spend tons of money redesigning our multiple-warhead ICBMs so that they can carry only one bomb instead of three. Rosett ruefully refers to this as "preemptive disarmament."
The difference between the liberal and conservative perspectives on the consequence of this policy change couldn’t be starker. Kaplan says that it “will greatly reduce...any fear in the Kremlin that the United States might be planning a disarming first-strike against Russia...[t]his could do much to build trust and stabilize relations.” But Rosett counters: “Obama is introducing into global affairs a growing measure of wild uncertainty over what will replace the folding U.S. security umbrella. If anything, this will fuel a rush across the board for nuclear weapons.”
Aside from the moral sophistry of the liberal argument, it misses the important point of any nuclear policy, which is to deter the world’s bad guys from ever testing our resolve and mettle. Obama, on the other hand, intends to use the new policy to signal to our enemies our good intentions and our peaceful motives. Think about this: would a president and administration comfortable with American power and confident of American motives ever feel the need to convince our enemies that we mean them no harm?
When you strip away all the high-minded sentiment of the President's vision of a nuclear-free world, three things are evident. One is that Obama’s policy is unilateral to the core; America’s disarmament is not conditioned in the least on the behavior of our adversaries or enemies. In fact, it is based entirely on the notion that our preemptive disarmament will make the world feel safer and thus induce the world’s malefactors to follow suit.
Second, the policy shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of countries. Nations, like people, act out of self-interest, and it is well nigh impossible to believe that our adversaries will simply suspend their development of weapons of mass destruction because we retire our MIRVs. It is more reasonable to conclude they will instead exploit the gap created by our move towards a “no first use” policy and a standing down of our nuclear arsenal.
Third, the policy pokes a finger in the eyes of our allies. Whatever the effect of the policy on our enemies, there can be no doubt that our allies will come to doubt our resolve in coming to their defense (especially since it appears we will not come to our own). This will lead them to reconsider strengthening their own non-conventional capabilities-- or worse, seek protection under the nuclear umbrella of one of our adversaries.
Speaking of adversaries, you have to hand it to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For all his faults, he doesn’t mince his words. Obama’s own actions prove that Ahmadinejad is right-- he is but a newcomer on the world stage whose sweat has yet to dry.
Unfortunately for the rest of us, the sweating has barely started.
No comments:
Post a Comment